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Bioethical principles,1 human rights and the law are interlinked. 
Aspects of the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-ma-
leficence and justice are included in the South African Consti-
tution2 and the country’s statutory and common law. A breach 
of these ethical principles and the Constitution may lead to an 
action for medical malpractice or professional negligence.
In this paper, I explore the link between bioethical princi-
ples, human rights and the law.
Autonomy, human rights and the law
The principle of patient autonomy recognises the duty of health 
professionals to respect the freedom of patients to make de-
cisions for themselves.1 Autonomy is recognised in the Con-
stitution in the provisions regarding the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity;3 the right to privacy;4 the right to life5 
(which includes the right of mentally competent patients not to 
live by refusing treatment);6 the right to freedom of movement7 
(e.g. the right of mentally competent patients to voluntarily dis-
charge themselves);8 and the right to freedom of religion and 
belief 9 (e.g. respecting a mentally competent patient’s right to 
refuse medical treatment for themselves on religious grounds 
– but not necessarily to refuse treatment for their children in 
life-threatening situations).10 Given that informed consent and 
confidentiality are cornerstones of medical practice, I shall fo-
cus on the right to bodily and psychological integrity and the 
right to privacy.
Bodily and psychological integrity
According to the Constitution, everyone has the right to bodily 
and psychological integrity, which includes the right: (i) to make 
decisions about reproduction; (ii) to security and control over 
their body; and (iii) not to be subjected to medical or scientific 
experiments without their consent.3 An infringement of these 
rights (e.g. by treating a person without his consent) would not 
only be a breach of his constitutional rights but also a breach 
of the National Health Act.11
The National Health Act5 provides that, as part of informed 
consent, every health care provider must inform a user or 
patient, in a language the user understands, of (i) the user’s 
health status – except where it would be contrary to the best in-
terests of the user; (ii) the range of diagnostic procedures and 
treatment options available to the user; (iii) the benefits, risks, 
costs and consequences generally associated with each op-
tion; and (iv) the user’s right to refuse health services, includ-
ing an explanation of the implications, risks and obligations of 
such refusal.12
According to the National Health Act,13 patients may only 
be treated without consent in emergency situations where: (i) 
failure to treat the patient or a group of people which includes 
the patient, will result in a serious risk to public health (e.g. 
patients with extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis); or (ii) any 
delay in the provision of treatment may result in the patient’s 
death or irreversible damage to his health while he has not 
expressly or impliedly or by conduct refused the service (e.g. 
refusing a blood transfusion for religious reasons). The latter 
provision mirrors common law.14
In common law, treating a patient without informed consent 
would be unlawful and would constitute assault.15 In terms of 
common law, informed consent means that the patient must 
have: (i) the capacity to consent; (ii) knowledge of the nature 
and extent of the harm or risk involved in the treatment or pro-
cedure; (iii) an appreciation and understanding of the nature of 
the harm or risk; (iv) voluntarily consented to accepting the harm 
or assuming the risk; and (v) given a comprehensive consent 
extending to the entire transaction and its consequences.6
The term ‘risk’ in common law refers to ‘material risk’, which 
means that: (i) a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if 
warned about it, would attach significance to it; and (ii) the at-
tending doctor should reasonably be aware that the patient, if 
warned, would attach significance to it.6
Privacy and confidentiality
According to the Constitution, everyone has a right to privacy 
which includes not having the privacy of their communications 
infringed.4 A breach of confidentiality by a medical practitioner 
or other health care professional is clearly an impairment of a 
patient’s right not to have the privacy of his communications in-
fringed. Likewise, obtaining information about a person without 
his consent would amount to an invasion of privacy. For exam-
ple, the failure to obtain proper consent to test a person’s blood 
after he had voluntarily given a blood sample, was held to be a 
violation of the person’s constitutional right to privacy.16
An invasion of privacy would also be a contravention of the 
National Health Act.5 According to this Act, all information con-
cerning a user of health services, including information relating 
to his health status, treatment or stay in a health establish-
ment, is confidential. Such information may not be disclosed 
unless: (i) the user consents to the disclosure in writing; (ii) a 
court order or any law requires the disclosure; or (iii) non-dis-
closure of the information would represent a serious threat to 
public health.17
According to common law, it would amount to an action-
able invasion of privacy to obtain information about a patient’s 
health status, or to make disclosures about a person’s health 
status, without his consent. For example, a doctor was held 
liable for invasion of privacy where, without the patient’s con-
sent, he disclosed the patient’s HIV status on a social occasion 
to health professionals who were not treating the patient.18
Beneficence, human rights and the law
The principle of beneficence recognises the duty of health 
professionals to do good for their patients.1 Beneficence is 
recognised in the provisions of the Constitution that state that 
everyone has a right to life19 (e.g. patients should be provided 
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with life-saving treatment where this is necessary);20 access 
to health care within available resources21 (e.g. HIV-positive 
patients should be provided with access to proper medication if 
they cannot afford it), including reproductive health care9 (e.g. 
the right to obtain a legal termination of pregnancy);22  children 
have a right to basic health care services23 (e.g. babies born 
of HIV-positive mothers should be provided with prophylactic 
treatment);24 and that everyone has the right of access to infor-
mation25 (e.g. access to their health records).
Access to health care
One of the objects of the National Health Act is to protect, re-
spect, promote and fulfil the rights of the people of South Af-
rica to the progressive realisation of the constitutional right of 
access to health care services, including reproductive health 
care.25 Thus the National Health Act5 provides that, subject to 
any conditions prescribed by the Minister of Health, the state 
and clinics and community health centres funded by the state 
must provide: (a) pregnant and lactating women and children 
below the age of six years, who are not members or benefici-
aries of medical aid schemes, with free health services; (b) all 
persons, except members of medical aid schemes and their 
dependants and persons receiving compensation for com-
pensable occupational diseases, with free primary health care 
services; and (c) women who qualify for a termination of preg-
nancy under the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,26 
with free termination of pregnancy services.27
Positive duties in common law
A common law example of the beneficence principle is where 
the law imposes a duty on certain people to act positively be-
cause: (i) of their prior conduct (e.g. the duty on a theatre sister 
to ensure that all swabs used in an operation are accounted 
for);28 (ii) they have created a dangerous situation (e.g. the duty 
on a doctor to rectify the situation where a patient has been 
harmed through the former’s professional negligence);9 (iii) a 
statute imposes a duty on them to act (e.g. the duty on certain 
people, including health professionals, to report abuse in terms 
of the Child Care Act29 or Aged Person’s Act);30 (iv) a special 
relationship exists between them and the other person (e.g. 
the doctor-patient relationship, or the duty imposed on prison 
authorities to provide ill prisoners with medical attention);31 and 
(v) society would be outraged if they did not act positively to 
prevent harm to a person in danger (e.g. a psychologist not 
warning a woman that her ex-partner intends to kill her,32 or a 
health worker not warning a patient that his partner is HIV-posi-
tive when, after counselling, the latter refuses to warn or take 
steps to protect the patient from becoming infected).33
Non-maleficence, human rights and the 
law
The principle of non-maleficence recognises the duty of health 
professionals not to harm their patients.1 Non-maleficence is 
invoked in the constitutional provisions dealing with the right 
of everyone to an environment that is not harmful to health 
or well-being;34 and the provision that nobody may be refused 
emergency medical treatment.35 Other constitutional provisions 
that promote non-maleficence include the right of people not to 
be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading man-
ner36 (e.g. patients left to lie on the floor, or babies crammed 
into cardboard boxes instead of cots); not to be subjected to 
medical or scientific experiments without their informed con-
sent37 (e.g. patients must be informed that a health service is 
for experimental or research purposes);38 or not to be denied 
the right to practise their religion or culture or to speak their 
language39 (i.e. health care personnel must communicate with 
patients in a language they can understand).40 The provisions 
dealing with the environment and the refusal of emergency 
treatment will now be specifically considered.
Environment not harmful to health and well-
being
One of the objects of the National Health Act is to protect, re-
spect, promote and fulfil the rights of the people of South Africa 
to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-be-
ing.41 In the health care environment, therefore, patients and 
health care personnel should not be exposed to situations 
which are harmful to their health or well-being. The National 
Health Act provides that health establishments must imple-
ment measures to minimise injury or damage to the persons 
and property of health care personnel working in such estab-
lishments, and must minimise disease transmission.42 For ex-
ample, hospitals should ensure that universal precautions are 
taken to protect their staff and the public from exposure to HIV 
infection, and make sure that when staff have been exposed 
to HIV (e.g. as a result of a needle-stick injury), prophylactic 
measures are taken to prevent seroconversion.
Emergency medical treatment
The National Health Act,43 like the Constitution,25 stipulates that 
a health care provider, health worker or health establishment 
may not refuse a person emergency medical treatment; this 
applies to both the public and private sectors. For instance, 
if an indigent person who is not a member of a medical aid 
scheme is injured in a motor collision near a private hospi-
tal and requires emergency treatment, he would have to be 
stabilised by the private hospital before being sent to a public 
hospital. It would be unconstitutional for the private hospital to 
refuse the person emergency medical treatment on the basis 
of the person’s inability to pay. Emergency medical treatment, 
however, refers to ‘a dramatic sudden situation or event which 
is of a passing nature in terms of time’ (e.g. a car collision or 
some other emergency matter) and not a chronic terminal ill-
ness such as kidney disease requiring dialysis.44
Professional negligence
In common law, health professionals should not harm their pa-
tients through professional negligence,18 for instance by fail-
ing to exercise reasonable skill and care45 or omitting to warn 
a patient about certain symptoms.46 Medical practitioners are 
judged by the standard of care that would be exercised by a 
practitioner reasonably in his branch of the profession.18 The 
test is: how would a reasonably competent practitioner in that 
branch of the profession have acted in a similar situation?47 
In other words, would a reasonably competent practitioner 
in the position of the defendant have foreseen the likelihood 
of harm and, if so, would he have taken steps to prevent it 
from happening? If such a practitioner would have foreseen 
the likelihood of harm and taken steps to guard against it, and 
the defendant practitioner did not, the latter would be liable for 
negligence.48 If the harm could not have been foreseen by a 
reasonably competent practitioner in the defendant’s position, 
the latter would not be liable.49
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A greater degree of skill is expected of a specialist than a 
general practitioner;18 except in emergencies, a general prac-
titioner will be negligent if he undertakes work that requires 
specialist skill which the practitioner concerned does not 
have.50 The more complicated or dangerous the procedure, the 
greater the degree of skill and care required to be exercised 
by the medical practitioner concerned; failure to measure up 
to the required standard may result in professional and legal 
liability (e.g. using dangerous substances).51 Courts will, how-
ever, take into account the resources available at the time. The 
health practitioner will be judged according to the standard that 
would be expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in 
the relevant branch of the profession faced with a similar short-
age of resources.52
The degree of skill and care expected of a reasonably com-
petent medical practitioner is a question of evidence,53 but the 
courts will not rely on medical evidence alone to determine 
the risks involved.9 Medical opinion not supported by logic will 
be disregarded by the courts, and professional opinion over-
looking obvious risks will not be relied upon.54 Courts – not 
the medical profession – will determine the standard of care 
to be exercised. Spurious defences may result in cost awards 
against the medical practitioner concerned.38
Courts have consistently refused to apply the ‘Res ipsa 
loquitur’ (the facts speak for themselves) principle to medical 
negligence cases.18 The principle allows the court to draw an 
inference of negligence if the plaintiff proves that the event that 
occurred does not usually occur unless somebody is negligent 
– a classic example is a swab left inside a patient’s abdomen 
after an operation.18 If the principle were to be applied in a swab 
case, the patient would merely have to prove that the swab 
was left in his or her abdomen, and the defendant surgeon or 
theatre sister would then have to give an explanation as to why 
they were not negligent. The courts, however, do not apply the 
dictum in such cases, and the burden is on the patient to prove 
that there was negligence on the part of the surgeon or theatre 
sister.18 It has been suggested that the precept should apply to 
the medical profession because of the ‘principles of procedural 
equity and constitutional considerations’.55
Vicarious liability
Vicarious liability means that a person is liable for another 
person’s wrongful act even though the first person is not at 
fault. Whether or not medical practitioners are vicariously li-
able for the acts or omissions of their assistants depends upon 
whether the latter are under their control regarding the manner 
in which they carry out their work.56 In other words, the liability 
of practitioners will depend upon whether they tell their assist-
ants what to do and how to do it. Where doctors employ their 
own assistants, they will be liable for any wrongs committed by 
such assistants during the course and scope of their employ-
ment. However, where assistants are employed by a health 
care establishment, doctors will only be vicariously liable if the 
assistants fall under their control. Thus, courts have held that 
theatre sisters18 and anaesthetists57 do not fall under the con-
trol of surgeons in theatre, and the latter cannot be held liable 
for their wrongful acts.
Justice, human rights and the law
The principle of justice recognises the duty of health profes-
sionals to treat their patients equally and fairly. Justice and fair-
ness are enshrined in the constitutional principles of equality 
and non-discrimination58 (e.g. patients of different racial, social 
or economic classes should be treated equally); the right to 
dignity;59 and the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair administrative action60 (e.g. patients should be given writ-
ten reasons for administrative decisions that deny them ac-
cess to particular treatment).61 Let us now consider the provi-
sions regarding equality and non-discrimination and dignity in 
more detail.
Equality and non-discrimination
The Constitution lists the categories of persons who will be 
presumed to have been unfairly discriminated against once 
they can prove discrimination.62 In all other cases, the persons 
being discriminated against will have to prove that the discrimi-
nation is unfair. The listed categories are persons discriminat-
ed against on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language 
and birth.63 A person who feels unfairly discriminated against 
may bring a civil action for damages.
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Dis-
crimination Act64 lists the same categories of persons as are 
listed in the Constitution as ‘prohibited grounds’ for discrimina-
tion.65 The Act goes further and states that ‘prohibited grounds’ 
also include any other grounds where discrimination on that 
ground (i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; (ii) 
undermines human dignity; and (iii) adversely affects the equal 
enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious man-
ner that is comparable to discrimination on one of the listed 
grounds.66 If discrimination did take place on one of the listed 
grounds or the additional grounds, there will be a presump-
tion of unfairness.67 The Act lists in a schedule examples of 
unfair practices in the health sector, such as unfairly denying 
or refusing any person access to health care facilities; failing 
to make health care facilities available to any person; and re-
fusing to provide reasonable health services to the elderly.68 A 
person who feels unfairly discriminated against may bring an 
action for redress in an equality court.69
The National Health Act provides that health care personnel 
may not be unfairly discriminated against on account of their 
health status.70 However, the head of the health establishment 
concerned may, in accordance with any guidelines determined 
by the Minister of Health, impose conditions on the service that 
may be rendered by a health care provider or health worker on 
the basis of his or her health status.71
Dignity
The right to dignity is protected in the Constitution72 and is 
one of its core values.73 The Constitution is founded on the 
values of ‘human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms’.74 Therefore, a 
person whose dignity has been impaired may sue for a breach 
of their constitutional right to dignity.
In common law, a violation of a person’s right to dignity is ac-
tionable; for instance, where a person has been subjected to in-
sulting language75 or insulting gestures;76 unlawfully threatened 
with ejection from premises;77 or compelled to expose their na-
ked body to others.78 In such instances, the injured person may 
sue the wrongdoer for damages, and in serious cases may also 
lay criminal charges.61,62 For example, medical practitioners or 
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other health professionals who insult patients, unlawfully refuse 
to treat them and threaten to have them ejected from a hospital 
or surgery, or who humiliate patients by unjustifiably exposing 
their bodies or parts of their bodies to the view of others, may 
face disciplinary action or civil or criminal legal proceedings.
Conclusion
Doctors should always follow the ethical principles of patient 
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice; by doing 
so, they will be complying with the ethical rules of the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa, the Constitution, the Na-
tional Health Act, other legislation, and common law. Ethical 
medical practice will protect doctors from both disciplinary ac-
tion and the legal consequences of medical malpractice. Ethi-
cal practice across the medical profession also may have a 
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